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Given the labor market challenges that countries in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region are facing (notably high unemployment, prevalence of skills
mismatches, low labor market mobility, and lack of formal employment networks),
Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) could be a relevant policy instrument to
assist unemployed individuals find jobs. This study first introduces a conceptual
framework for ALMPs and describes their overall impact on employment outcomes.
The study then reviews the provision of ALMPs in a selected group of countries in
the MENA region, with a focus on public provision through existing public
employment agencies. The study also presents the results of some of the few
available robust evaluations of AMLPs the region, in a context where information
about program effectiveness and efficiency is largely lacking. Finally, the study
identifies key challenges in the delivery of publicly provided ALMPs in MENA
countries, namely poor administrative capacity, system fragmentation, lack of
governance and accountability, regulation bottlenecks, and flaws in program design.
To address these challenges, the study proposes a reform agenda based on a four-
pillar policy framework: (i) develop results-based Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); (ii)
promote systems and program integration; (iii) develop results-based monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) frameworks; and (iv) promote entrepreneurship/self-employment,
on-the-job training and life skills training among job seekers.
JEL codes: J20, J30, J40, J50
Keywords: Labor policy; labor markets; unemployment; training; labor regulation;
school-to-job transition1. Introduction
The study draws on data collected through surveys administered to public employment
agencies in selected Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries to identify key
constraints and options for reforming publicly provided ALMPs.
Unemployment rates in MENA are among the highest in the world, and the region
has a large share of untapped human resources. Female labor force participation, at
25.4 percent in the Middle East and 28.1 percent in North Africa, is significantly lower
than the world average of 51.6 percent (World Bank 2013).1 Youth unemployment is
higher in the Middle East (19 percent) and North Africa (25 percent) than in any other
developing region. At the same time, population growth in MENA is also among the
highest in the world, with a demographic transition in which the youth bulge (agesAngel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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cent worldwide (World Bank 2013).
Although unemployment rates in MENA are high and rising, employers in the region
are still struggling to fill vacancies primarily due to a shortage of candidates with the
relevant qualifications and skills (World Bank 2013). Indeed, more than half of em-
ployers in MENA identify skills mismatches as a major constraint to doing business
and to firm growth, according to enterprise surveys. This percentage is the highest
among developing regions (World Bank 2013). A combination of inadequate skills and
lack of information about existing vacancies is contributing to critical labor market fail-
ures that restraint employment mobility. This is confirmed by available data from em-
ployment agencies throughout the region suggesting that thousands of vacancies are
not being filled, despite the existence of thousands of individuals who are both willing
and able to work (see Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013 and Belghazi 2012).
Available evidence also indicates important constraints to labor market transitions
in MENA (World Bank 2013). Recent work shows that while the school-to-work transi-
tion in developed countries generally takes less than two years (measured as the differ-
ence between the age at which 50 percent of the population has left education and the
age at which 50 percent has found employment), in many MENA countries it takes
over five years (World Bank 2013; Angel-Urdinola and Semlali 2010). Moreover, private
and public formal employment networks play a limited role in labor intermediation
(Gatti et al. 2012).
In a context where skills mismatches prevail, unemployment soars, information about
job opportunities is asymmetric, and there seems to be vacancies that cannot be filled,
ALMPs could help to enhance labor mobility and improve job matching. Available evi-
dence suggests that ALMPs do not have a good track record of improving labor market
outcomes in developing countries. However, poor performance of ALMPs should not
lead to the conclusion that they are not a relevant policy instrument to address labor
market challenges. Instead, the causes of their apparent failure need to be closely exam-
ined. Existing analytical studies and evaluations suggest that ALMPs in developing
countries suffer from poor design and implementation as well as from inappropriate
governance and accountability arrangements that reduce incentives to respond to the
needs of job seekers and employers (Betcherman et al. 2004; Card et al. 2010;
Kuddo 2009; Rodriguez-Planas and Benus 2010).
This study offers a comprehensive look at the problems facing publicly provided ALMPs
in a selected group of MENA countries, takes stock at some initiatives that seem to
have had positive results in the region, and proposes a policy reform agenda to improve
effectiveness and delivery of ALMPs in the region. Admittedly, ALMPs should not be seen
as substitutes for private-led employment creation or as a solution to the many structural
constraints of the region’s labor market, such as stagnant labor demand, low productivity,
low competitiveness, and high informality. However, if well designed and effectively
delivered, ALMPs could be a mechanism for addressing high unemployment rates, all
while providing the region’s population with some immediate and concrete results.
2. ALMPs and public employment services: an overview
The two overarching objectives of ALMPs are to enhance employability and promote
job creation. ALMPs are considered “active” programs because beneficiaries are
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benefit. In this respect, ALMPs differ from “passive” measures such as unemployment
insurance/assistance, which are designed to mitigate the financial hardship of un-
employment. ALMPs can help correct employment barriers that can arise from the ex-
istence of skills mismatches, insufficient labor demand, and information asymmetries
(Table 1). ALMPs have been widely used by governments around the world to lessen
the impacts of economic downturns by providing both employers and employees with
incentives to participate in the labor market (see Kuddo 2009).
International experience shows that the impact of ALMPs on labor market outcomes
is positive, but modest. While many ALMPs have effectively addressed market failures
in countries with very different labor market challenges, many others have not
succeeded in improving beneficiaries’ livelihoods. Using meta-analysis, Card et al.
(2010) reviewed a set of impact evaluations of ALMPs for a sample containing 199 sep-
arate “program estimates” (i.e., estimates of the impact of a particular program on a
specific subgroup of participants). The estimates were drawn from 97 studies
conducted between 1995 and 2007. The authors found that (a) job search assistance
programs are likely to yield positive impacts on employment outcomes, that is, employ-
ment levels and wages; (b) training programs yield relatively positive impacts on benefi-
ciaries’ employment outcomes in the medium term, but often have insignificant or
negative impacts in the short term; and (c) the impact of public works programs on
employment outcomes is limited. Indeed, the efficiency of ALMPs depends largely on
their design, as well as on the country’s institutional capacity to provide services con-
tinuously on a national scale (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010; World Bank 2013).
Program costs for ALMPs vary widely, and some ALMPs are more cost-effective than
others. ALMPs that seek to encourage labor demand in times of economic downturn
generally involve providing subsidies to either firms or workers. The amount of the
transfer (and thus total program cost) depends largely on the country’s economic and
political context as well as on its labor market institutions, including wage levels.
Training programs also have variable costs, which reflect the training’s length, content,
and necessary equipment. As a result, policy makers need to pay special attention to
the cost-effectiveness of ALMPs. For example, results from Romania show that training
programs are more cost-effective than employment services and public works programs
(Rodriguez-Planas and Benus 2010). The authors found that training programs have, on
average, high placement rates after program completion (above 40 percent) and low per-
capita placement costs (about $2,000 per beneficiary). In contrast, public works programs
have, on average, low insertion rates after program completion (approximately 12 percent)
and are 10 times more costly on a per-capita basis than training programs.Table 1 Selection of ALMP Type by Objective and Employment Barrier
Barrier to employment Type of ALMP Program objective
Skills mismatches Training (on the job, in class), activation. Enhance employability




Insufficient labor demand Wage subsidies, public works programs,
self-employment, work sharing and
short work.
Promote job creation
Source: processed from Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010.
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Public employment agencies are the institutions responsible for delivering public
employment services (PES). These agencies deliver employment services free of
charge to job seekers (both the unemployed and job changers) as well as to em-
ployers and the inactive population. Services provided by public employment agen-
cies include (a) information services, ranging from ad hoc information and referrals
for job seekers to job brokerage services for employers; (b) individual case manage-
ment services, such as intensive counseling and guidance, job search assistance,
and personalized action plans; and (c) active and passive programs, including oppor-
tunities for work, training, and other forms of assistance such as unemployment
insurance.
In developed countries, PES have been instrumental in helping unemployed workers
find jobs. This is the finding of most experimental studies carried out in Canada, the
Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For example, a study in
Denmark found that workers who received personalized job search assistance, career
counseling, and regular check‐up meetings at the local public employment agency had
a 30 percent higher rate of employment than a control group that did not receive these
services (Graverson and Van Ours 2007). An evaluation of a similar package of services
in four regions of Sweden also found that participants had a 30 percent higher employ-
ment rate than a control group and, moreover, that the effects were most positive for
job seekers aged 45 years or older (Hägglund 2009). In contrast, individual case man-
agement services were found to be ineffective for young workers (in Canada and the
Netherlands) and in cases of mass layoffs (in Canada) (see Rodriguez-Planas 2007 for
an overview). In Romania, evidence suggests that both intermediation services and
small-business assistance programs can help the unemployed go back to work, but that
of these two types of PES, intermediation services have higher placement rates
(Rodriguez-Planas 2007).
In developing countries, the effects of PES on labor market outcomes have been
found to be less positive. Many developing countries have large informal sectors and
face low economic growth, conditions under which PES can play only a limited role, as
these programs are geared primarily toward wage employment (Betcherman et al.
2004). In general, the success of PES depends largely on program design and imple-
mentation as well as on institutional capacity of the public employment agency. Indeed,
successful PES are characterized by a combination of good design, implementation, and
governance features that include coordination with the private sector, quality assurance
and accreditation mechanisms, and solid monitoring and evaluation. Unfortunately,
these features are often lacking in PES offered by developing countries (Angel-Urdinola
et al. 2010).
Modern PES play an important activation role. The functions of PES have changed
over the years, partly because of the gradual disappearance of lifelong jobs and an in-
creasing need for job mobility. In the past, the role of PES was confined to job inter-
mediation and unemployment insurance. Today, many PES are helping individuals take
ownership of their own job search and human capital development—the so-called acti-
vation agenda. Activation policies encourage job seekers and other vulnerable groups
to become more active in finding work and improving their employability, including
investing in their own skills (see, for example, OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
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ciaries’ personal, social, and vocational skills and/or help them plan, design, and imple-
ment individual professional plans.3
Private sector involvement in the provision of PES has been a key feature of success-
ful PES reform (Kuddo, Kuddo 2012; Finn 2011). Private agencies are often more effi-
cient and effective than the public sector in the provision of PES, as they can provide
services to smaller, targeted segments of the labor market and are better positioned to
reach out to potential employers (Kuddo 2012). In general, public employment agencies
serve individuals with lower skills and limited education, while private employment
agencies serve the better-skilled and better-educated.43. Provision of ALMPs in MENA
This section provides an overview of provision of ALMPs in a selected group of MENA
countries, with a focus on public provision. While some MENA countries (Tunisia and
to some extent Morocco) still provide ALMPs primarily through the public sector,
others (such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan) actively involve the private sector in the
provision of training, job brokerage, and other labor market services. For instance,
according to a recent World Bank study, there are 45 licensed private employment
agencies in Jordan and 54 in Egypt. ALMPs are also subcontracted to external providers
in Lebanon (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013).3.1. Private provision
There is very little data or analysis of privately-provided ALMPs in MENA countries,
despite the fact they are very common in the region. The work of Angel-Urdinola et al.
(2010) is a first attempt to gather information on privately provided ALMPs in the
MENA region, with a focus on North Africa. Based on data collected in 2009–10, the
authors compiled an inventory of privately provided ALMPs across nine economies in
the region: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, West Bank and
Gaza, and Yemen. Information about 17 programs was collected in Egypt, where pri-
vate provision of ALMPs is very common, followed by Morocco (14 programs), West
Bank and Gaza (13 programs), Lebanon (10 programs), and Jordan (8 programs).
Training is the most common ALMP offered by private providers in MENA coun-
tries. According to Angel-Urdinola et al. (2010), private providers in the region offer
primarily traditional in-class training, which accounted for about 91 percent of all
interventions included in the inventory. Other employment services, such as entre-
preneurship training, intermediation, and self-employment promotion, together con-
stituted less than 9 percent of all privately provided ALMPs. According to the
authors, most of the training programs in the inventory focus solely on the provision
of hard skills (64 percent) and are conducted in classrooms (71 percent). Very few
privately provided training programs surveyed as part of this study provide on-the-job
training, soft-skills training, or intermediation services, even though international
best practices show that these are critical to improve the employability
and employment chances of unemployed individuals. University graduates in urban
areas are the main beneficiaries of privately provided ALMPs in MENA countries
(Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010).
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While publicly provided ALMPs are more diverse than those provided by the private
sector in terms of types of programs, training remains the most popular ALMP pro-
vided by the public sector in MENA countries. Angel-Urdinola et al. (2013) conducted
the first survey of publicly provided ALMPs in a selected group of MENA countries.
The authors surveyed a total of 33 ALMPs that were implemented in 2010 by the pub-
lic employment agencies of seven countries in the region: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
The study found that the majority of these ALMPs focused on enhancing the employ-
ability of program participants, with training being the most widely used intervention
(Figure 1). In fact, 30 percent of the ALMPs surveyed for the study focused on voca-
tional training. Morocco and Yemen did offer packages that combined in-class training
with other services such as wage subsides and start-up incentives. In Yemen, only one
ALMP was implemented by the public employment agency in 2010, but this program
included several components such as training, labor intermediation, direct job creation,
and out-of-work income support. Other ALMPs that were implemented by the public
employment agencies that participated in this study included direct job creation
through public works (15 percent of all programs in the inventory), start-up incentives
(9 percent), and programs targeted to persons with disabilities (3 percent).
Employment-incentive programs, mainly wage subsidies, have a prominent role in
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. These programs encourage potential employers to hire
labor. For example, a program in Jordan subsidizes 100 percent of the employee’s con-
tribution and 50 percent of the employer’s contribution to social security for a period
of two years. In Tunisia, on-the-job training programs targeting primarily first-time job
seekers subsidize part of social security contributions and wages for a period of one
year (renewable), thus decreasing labor costs and promoting job creation.Figure 1 Distribution by Program Type of Publicly Provided ALMPs, Selected MENA Countries, 2008
and 2010. Source: Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013. Note: Countries included are Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
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(47 percent) target high-skilled unemployed individuals, notably university graduates
who are first-time job seekers. Considering that high-skilled youth face higher than
average, and increasing, rates of unemployment, it is no surprise that publicly provided
ALMPs target this segment of the population (World Bank 2013).5 Nevertheless, there
are some publicly provided ALMPs that benefit individuals living in rural areas and tar-
get the low-skilled unemployed, women, and other vulnerable groups. While most pub-
licly provided ALMPs are open to both men and women, women are radically
underrepresented, except in Tunisia (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013). This could be due to
many factors, including lack of schedule flexibility and child care constraints.
Most public employment agencies in MENA countries offer intermediation services.
Many countries in the region have developed job banks that can be accessed electronic-
ally, using home computers or computers in local employment offices or other public
premises. Employers can enter their vacancies, and the job seeker can upload a curricu-
lum vitae (CV) to the database with the help of a placement officer or independently.
Despite their availability, intermediation services are not widely used by either em-
ployers or employees. This is partly because public employment agencies in the region
display limited capacity to do effective matching (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013).
According to the authors, this is true to a large extent, as public employment agencies
in the region generally do not have a systematic way (or staff dedicated) to match regis-
tered unemployed to available vacancies.4. Challenges for an effective public delivery in MENA countries
This section briefly describes the main obstacles to the effective and efficient delivery
of publicly provided ALMPs in a selected group of MENA countries. The analysis,
which leverages the findings of Angel-Urdinola et al. (2013), focuses on institutional
and operational challenges. Other factors affecting the performance of the region’s
labor market, such as stagnant labor demand, skills mismatches, and demographics, are
beyond the scope of this study.4.1. System and program fragmentation
Countries in the region have different institutional arrangements for administering
publicly provided ALMPs. For example, in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, these programs
are administered directly by the Ministry of Labor, through a specialized department
within the ministry. On the other hand, in Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, these
programs are administered by independent and autonomous public employment agen-
cies that are supervised by the Ministry of Labor.
The delivery of publicly provided ALMPs, and especially of training services, is typic-
ally fragmented. Many government entities other than national public employment
agencies are involved in the provision of publicly provided ALMPs. For example, Egypt
has 1,237 vocational training centers that are affiliated with 27 different ministries and
that operate somewhat independently throughout the country’s 19 governorates. At the
same time, the Ministry of Education administers around 1,600 technical and voca-
tional schools, while the Ministry of Higher Education manages 47 middle technical
institutes.
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cation and inefficiencies. In Tunisia, publicly provided ALMPs, notably public works
and employment programs targeted to vulnerable groups such as disabled people, are
often delivered by different ministries, namely Vocational Training and Employment,
Regional Development, and Social Affairs. Due to poor inter-ministerial coordination
and lack of a single registration mechanism, many of these programs are redundant
and provide incentives for individuals to participate in several programs, even concur-
rently, thereby promoting welfare dependency (Belghazi 2012). Furthermore, there is
little coordination between training programs and the needs of the labor market. Cur-
ricula are outdated and are not reviewed frequently, and many training centers provide
predesigned training courses that do not necessarily meet the needs of the private sec-
tor (Angel-Urdinola and Semlali 2010).
Moreover, program fragmentation is also common. Many MENA countries have de-
veloped a plethora of small and independent employment programs that target various
groups and that are implemented at different geographic levels by different stake-
holders. However, these programs lack complementarity and coherence, thus leading to
redundancy and inefficiencies. For example, before 2009, the public employment
agency in Tunisia offered 41 employment programs, many of which were largely redun-
dant and duplicative. Upon completing one program, many individuals simply moved
to another, and some even enrolled in more than one program simultaneously (Belghazi
2012). Tunisia just recently consolidated all of its employment programs into four, a re-
form that is expected to increase program effectiveness and efficiency.
4.2. Limited administrative capacity
An important factor contributing to the success of publicly provided ALMPs is the in-
stitutional capacity of the national employment agencies. This includes the number and
qualifications of their staff at both national and regional levels, their geographic cover-
age, the legal framework in which they operate, and their budget allocations. The
amount of resources available for financing ALMPs has often been used as a proxi for
service delivery capacity. Of course, this proxy has a lot of caveats as available resources
may or may not be used effectively. Nevertheless, higher expenditures on ALMPs are
often associated with higher program/service coverage, better quality of staff, and more
resources for proper monitoring and evaluation (Kuddo 2009). There is wide variation
in spending on publicly provided ALMPs across MENA countries. According to avail-
able data, in 2010–11, Tunisia spent 0.80 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on
ALMPs, Morocco 0.10 percent, and Lebanon 0.04 percent. In contrast, across the
European Union (EU), a total of 256 billion euros, or 2.2 percent of EU-27 GDP, was
spent on ALMPs in 2009—a year of economic downturn (Kuddo 2012).
Public employment agencies (PEA) in MENA countries are generally understaffed.
The workload of caseworkers, or those PEA staff in direct contact with clients, is crit-
ical for the effective and efficient provision of publicly provided ALMPs. Available data
from 2009 show wide variations in levels of staffing among the seven MENA countries
that participated in the study (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013). The highest staff caseload
was reported in Syria, with more than 14,000 registered job seekers per caseworker.
Next was Morocco, with over 1,500 job seekers per caseworker, followed by Lebanon,
with over 1,200 (Table 2). Of the total PEA staff in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, fewer
Table 2 Numbers of Unemployed, Registered Job Seekers, and Public Employment
















total PEA staff (%)
Egypt, Arab Rep. 895.1 1,600 1,550 577 97
Jordan 28.0 133 63 444 47
Lebanonc 12.2 32 10 1,222 31
Morocco 517.0 547 343 1,507 63
Syrian Arab Republic 1,703.8d 397 120 14,199 30
Tunisia 281 1,271 1052 267 82
Yemen, Rep. — — 60 — —
Source: Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013.
Note: — = not available.
a. Based on latest available labor force survey data.
b. Average number of registered unemployed per PEA staff person in contact with job seekers.
c. Beirut only.
d. Public sector only, including individuals queuing for civil service and other public sector jobs.
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around 1:150, while the ratio recommended by the ILO is even lower, at 1:100.6 There-
fore, in many countries in the MENA region, the number of PEA staff, in particular
caseworkers, is inadequate for the provision of effective and personalized mediation
services.7
With few exceptions, public employment agencies in the MENA region play a limited
role in job matching. In Egypt and Lebanon (Beirut only), however, public employment
agencies are quite active in registering job vacancies (Table 3). On the other hand, the
job-seekers-to-vacancy ratio is relatively higher in both Jordan and Morocco but is still
acceptable for international standards, especially compared to developing economies.8
However, and while this ratio provides important information on a PEA capacity to do
intermediation, it is the job placement rate that is critical for evaluating its efficiency.
In Egypt, less than 5 percent of registered job seekers are employed every month, in
Jordan less than 3 percent, and in Morocco only about 2 percent.
4.3. Lack of results-based monitoring and evaluation
Most publicly provided ALMPs in MENA countries do not have proper monitoring
and evaluation (M&E) frameworks. User feedback is largely absent, as is informationTable 3 Job-Seekers-to-Vacancy Ratio and Number of Job Placements per 1,000





















Egypt, Arab Rep. 895.1 222.9 4.0 40.1 45
Jordan 28.0 2.6 10.8 0.7 25
Lebanona 12.2 3.6 3.4 — —
Morocco 517.0 27.7 18.7 4.4 9
Tunisia 105.4 — — 1.6 —
Source: Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013.
Note: — = not available.
a. Beirut only.
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Angel-Urdinola et al. (2013) have output-based monitoring systems – whereby the
monitoring system focuses only on tracking the number of people benefiting from dif-
ferent services. Indeed, monitoring systems in MENA rarely track results-based indica-
tors related to the quality of the service or whether services contributed to improved
labor market outcomes of beneficiaries, such as their insertion to the labor market,
their wage, of their employment status (e.g. moving from informal to formal employ-
ment). Data on program outcomes, such as insertion rates and wages after program
completion, were not available for most of the programs included in the study. More-
over, rigorous program evaluations assessing the effectiveness of services provided is
largely lacking. Only a small minority (15 percent) conducted an impact evaluation,
and a mere handful (7 percent) carried out a cost-effectiveness analysis. Most of the
evaluations that were done lacked scientific rigor, rarely using control groups that
would have allowed for an estimation of the programs’ net impact. For example,
Morocco recently evaluated its three main ALMPs, but these evaluations were, for the
most part, qualitative and did not assess the program’s direct impact on labor market
outcomes. In Tunisia, there have been some attempts to evaluate employment pro-
grams delivered by the public employment agency, ANETI, but results are outdated,
sporadic, donor-driven, and lacking in scientific credibility (Belghazi 2012).
Table 4 shows the main findings of some of the few available rigorous impact evalua-
tions of ALMPs in the MENA region, all of which have been financed and carried out
by donors, especially the World Bank. It is important to point out that none of these
recent evaluations are of training programs, the most common type of ALMP in
MENA countries. In fact, three out of the four available impact evaluations are ofTable 4 Results of Available Impact Evaluations of ALMPs in the MENA region






Wage Subsidy + life skills
training
Jordan Groh et al.
(2012)
Wage subsidy: Large positive
effect on employment in the
short term; No impact after
14 months.
Life skills: no effect on
employment in the short term.
Little positive impact on
employment in the 14 months
after program completion.





technical and life skills
training + coaching.
Tunisia Premand et al.
(2011)
No effect on net employment.
Changed the composition of
employment (from wage to
self-employment). Positive
changes in behavioral skills





employment. Little or no effect




(other program components –
e.g. technical skills - have yet to
be evaluated)
Syria Haddad (2010). Increased knowledge of and
changed attitude (positively)
toward self-employment.
Source: Authors own elaboration.
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nity to assess the impact of this type of programs in the region. This could be partly
explained by the fact that entrepreneurship is seen by many as a possible response to
some of the main labor market challenges in the MENA region, especially in light of
poor economic growth and low investment levels. The findings of these evaluations will
be used in the next section as evidence supporting the reform agenda for ALMPs in
the MENA region proposed in this study.4.4. Program design
The success of ALMPs depends largely on program design and implementation. To ef-
fectively address a given failure in the labor market, it is critical to choose the right type
of ALMP. Equally important is identifying the specific design features that will increase
the likelihood of program success, independently of the program type. This section de-
scribes the main design challenges found among the publicly provided ALMPs in
MENA countries that were surveyed by Angel-Urdinola et al. (2013).Poor targeting practices Programs in the study do not use a consistent targeting
methodology. While some define a target group and eligibility criteria, weak institu-
tional capacity, limited access to data, and lack of information lead to poor targeting
practices. For instance, while some ALMPs target first-time job seekers, few programs
identify who among their beneficiaries will be hard to place. Therefore, these programs
end up benefiting individuals who would have obtained jobs without any intervention,
leading to deadweight losses. For instance, following the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia
introduced a program called AMAL (“hope” in Arabic), which provides first-time job
seekers with at least an associate’s degree from an accredited institution a monthly sti-
pend conditional on their participation in training, counseling, and/or internships.
Given Tunisia’s demographics and highly educated workforce, the pool of potential
beneficiaries far exceeded the Government’s capacity to deliver AMAL’s services to the
145,000 (versus the expected 50,000) jobseekers who enrolled in the program in 2011.
In fact, out of those who enrolled, less than 20 thousand received any type of service.
As a result, AMAL became, for the most part, a cash transfer program with negative
repercussions on the nation’s budget and on the employment outcomes of beneficiaries,
as the stipend allowed many to remain idle and continue to wait for public sector jobs
(Belghazi 2012).Supply-driven and in-class training programs The majority of training programs in
the study are supply-driven, and only a few are designed in close collaboration with the
private sector. Most are conducted in classrooms and focus largely on the provision of
hard skills. Only a few programs in the study focus on the provision of soft skills and/
or practical experience through on-the-job training.9 Both hard and soft skills, as well
as practical experience, are essential to increase the employability and insertion of pro-
gram beneficiaries. A recent evaluation of youth employment programs showed that
comprehensive programs—those combining in-class training with practical experience,
or combining in-class training and practical experience with other services such as life
skills training and counseling—have higher rates of success, with success defined as
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programs offering only in-class training or only practical experience were less success-
ful. Indeed, international evidence suggests that traditional in-class training programs
have a negative impact on beneficiaries’ chances of employment. However, the success
of training programs increases when they include life-skills or on-the-job training or
both (World Bank 2012).Entrepreneurship programs are limited in scope Entrepreneurship programs have
traditionally been at the core of employment policy in many MENA countries. Most of
these programs target the low-skilled unemployed and are delivered by social funds
(Egypt and Yemen), microcredit institutions (Tunisia), or donors (Egypt, Lebanon)
(Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010). National employment agencies in Egypt, Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria are now offering training programs for those registered
unemployed who want to establish their own business (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013).
However, entrepreneurship programs in MENA countries typically benefit relatively
few people and do not address some of the other key constraints facing potential entre-
preneurs, such as access to credit and the need for personalized coaching and incubator
services.Lack of graduation/exit strategies Many employment programs in MENA countries
lack a clear graduation/exit strategy, allowing program beneficiaries to become
dependent on government support and to stay in programs indefinitely. Benefits are
often too high and continue for too long, which creates distortions in the labor market
and discourages the unemployed from actively searching for a job. Transfers at such
levels are also fiscally unsustainable. While some programs provide referrals to employ-
ment services and require beneficiaries to comply with certain conditions to continue
receiving benefits, these conditions for the most part are not enforceable, given the lack
of monitoring systems and other capacity constraints. For example, in Tunisia, research
from Belghazi (2012) indicates that ALMP beneficiaries can benefit from programs
consecutively for long periods of time, often longer than 5 years.Lack of signaling Although its performance is far from ideal, the public sector is doing
better than the private sector in terms of program certification. In the MENA region,
as in most regions of the world, a diploma signals that its bearer has achieved a particu-
lar level of knowledge and competence, allowing access to higher levels of instruction.
Angel-Urdinola et al. (2010) find that less than 10 percent of training programs deliv-
ered by private providers in MENA countries provide beneficiaries with some type of
recognized credential upon program completion. In comparison, about 50 percent of
publicly provided training programs in the region do so. However, certification prac-
tices vary from country to country. For example, Yemen and Syria largely lack standard
certification systems and national qualifications frameworks, while Lebanon and Jordan
have accreditation systems that are better developed (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013).Lack of coordination with the private sector ALMPs in the MENA region are, for
the most part, conceived at the national level without taking into account regional and
Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 13 of 252013, 2:13
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/13local realities. Other important stakeholders, notably the private sector, are not
consulted at the design stage, which makes ALMPs ineffective in addressing the needs
of the labor market. In the case of ALMPs that seek to encourage labor demand
through wage subsidies, lack of ownership discourages companies from implementing
program components and from investing in program beneficiaries. This translates into
high levels of turnover among program beneficiaries and overall low insertion levels. In
Tunisia, administrative data indicate that less than 15 percent of all beneficiaries who
benefit from ALMPs find employment after program completion. Also, public employ-
ment agencies rarely accredit or assess the performance of the private operators they
work with to deliver ALMPs. Most private contractors are paid based on outputs,
usually the number of people trained, rather than based on the quality of the service
delivered. Consequently, many training programs offered by private providers are
supply-driven and of poor quality (Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013).5. A policy framework for the MENA region
This section proposes a policy framework for improving the delivery of publicly pro-
vided ALMPs in the MENA region. The 4 main obstacles to the effective and efficient
delivery of publicly provided ALMPs in the MENA region as discussed in Section IV
above are presented in column 1 of Table 5 below. Column 2 includes some concrete
examples of each of the 4 challenges, and Column 3 identifies four main policy direc-
tives to address these constraints: (i) develop results-based public-private partnerships
(PPPs); (ii) develop results-based monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks; (iii)
promote new approaches to entrepreneurship, on-the-job training (OJT), and life skills
training among job seekers; and (iv) promote systems and program integration. Policy
directives can apply to many or all concrete examples of one or more of the 4 con-
straints. For example, the policy directive “promote systems and program integration”
applies to all the concrete examples of the “system and program fragmentation” con-
straint, but it also applies to one of the concrete examples (Poor data quality of regis-
tries) of the “limited administrative capacity” constraint.
The policy directives included in the framework are based on available information of
what works and does not work in MENA countries, as well as on documented experi-
ences and lessons learned from throughout the world (Additional file 1: Table A1). The
main policy instruments that could be used to advance this policy agenda are described
below and summarized in Table 6.5.1 Develop results-based public-private partnerships
The importance of including the private sector in the delivery of employment services
was confirmed by the Private Employment Agencies Convention adopted by the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) in 1997 (Convention 181 supported by Recom-
mendation 188). It encouraged “cooperation between the public employment service
and private employment agencies in relation to the implementation of a national policy
on organizing the labour market.” For PES, one of the main advantages of cooperating
with or subcontracting other actors is that they offer more specialized services, which
are needed in light of the increasing complexity of the labor market. Nevertheless,
some countries in the region (e.g. Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
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ment agencies continues to have the monopoly in the provision of employment
services – although in most of these countries, private employment agencies operate in
one way or another. Therefore, easing any regulation constraints inhibiting the partici-
pation of the private sector in the provision of employment services should be a priority
for these countries, especially in light of the limited capacity of their public employment
agencies to provide services to an increasing number of job seekers.
Public-private partnerships can improve the delivery of ALMPs if incentives are
designed to provide high-quality services and if the performance of private partners is
monitored and evaluated against specific, predetermined results. In most high-income
countries, public employment agencies do not have a monopoly on the delivery of em-
ployment services. In fact, in the Netherlands all job seekers are referred to external
service providers, with public authorities serving primarily as gatekeepers of a private
quasi-market. However, Dutch public authorities are generally still responsible for pro-
cessing payments. Private providers can be employment agencies, including temporary
employment, recruitment, and guidance/counseling agencies; they may also be training
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Partnering with private service providers can ensure that programs respond to market
conditions, thus improving labor market outcomes among program beneficiaries.
Contracting out is key to ensuring more effective and efficient PPPs. Service con-
tracts with private providers are typically performance-based, covering a provider’s base
costs while providing an incentive for placement through a bonus tied to outcomes.10
Results-based contracting has become an international best practice. According to a
recent OECD report, Job Services Australia, the country’s system for delivering employ-
ment services, may have contributed to the strong performance of the Australian labor
market which, since 2009, has had the highest employment rate among G7 and OECD
G20 countries. Job Services Australia is the pioneer of results-based contracting for the
delivery of employment services. It features a one-stop shop that refers all the regis-
tered unemployed to for-profit and non-profit providers, which participate in a com-
petitive call for proposals and are awarded contracts that pay a standard service fee
plus a bonus both for results and for serving the hardest-to-place job seekers (Tergeist
and Grubb 2006) (Additional file 1: Table A1).
Based on the Australian model, other countries have also successfully introduced
performance-based systems to deliver employment services. For example, UK’s Job-
centre Plus provides payments to contractors depending on: (i) job outcome (off-flow
from benefit into employment) and (ii) sustainability of jobs (retention after 13/
26 weeks). This is also the case in Germany, where a placement voucher entitles the
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ceives a predetermined percentage of the payment at insertion and the remainder six
months after placement (Schneider 2008). Nordic countries, which have a strong trad-
ition of delivering employment services solely through their public employment agen-
cies, are also in the middle of reforming their systems to include private providers in
the delivery of public employment services. Results-based contracting requires a well-
developed network of private employment providers that may be lacking in most
MENA countries. However, developing the capacity of private employment providers
(and NGOs) as well as putting in place systems and procedures to help Governments
in MENA countries manage this kind of system seems a plausible option to improve
the delivery of public employment services in the short-run, especially given the re-
gion’s political economy and the weak administrative capacity of its public employment
agencies. Of course, in the long-run, a comprehensive public sector reform will be
required.
Beyond PPPs and results-based contracting, developing and implementing training
programs in close collaboration with the private sector is also highly recommended.
The Siyaha Project in Jordan is an example of an ALMP that successfully involved the
private sector throughout the project cycle. Siyaha is a demand-driven training program
financed by USAID that seeks to enhance the quality of training offered by the Voca-
tional Training Centers of the Ministry of Tourism in Jordan. Specifically, Siyaha fi-
nances: (i) the upgrading of the Vocational Training Centers, (ii) the revision of the
Centers’ curriculum, in close collaboration with the tourism industry specialists, (iii)
the introduction of soft-skills modules, and (iv) mandatory on-the-job training, whereby
the Vocational Training Centers sign contracts with accredited hotels and restaurants
to promote quality control and assurance. Siyaha targets primarily low-income youth
and women, all of whom receive an internationally accredited certification upon com-
pletion of the program. From 2006 to 2010, Siyaha benefited 3,000 individuals of whom
1,100 graduated from the program. From those who graduated, 57 percent landed a job
(USAID, Jordan Tourism Development Project – Siyaha. 2006–2007 Annual Report).
As public agencies in the region begin to work in partnership with the private sector,
it will be necessary to develop instruments that assist relevant stakeholders to promote
quality assurance and recognition of training programs delivered by the public and pri-
vate sector. For example, the development of a Qualifications Framework (QF), defined
as “an instrument for the development, classification and recognition of skills, knowledge
and competencies along a continuum of agreed levels” (Tuck 2007); can serve as the
basis for improving the quality and relevance of education, thus addressing the skills
mismatches that are so prevalent in MENA countries. At the regional level, QFs can
improve comparability of qualifications, promote mutual recognition of qualifications,
encourage credit transfer, develop national standards, and facilitate agreement on en-
trance requirements for higher education (Tuck 2007).
Finally, in order to improve the effectiveness of labor intermediation services, it is
recommended that public employment agencies partner with the private sector to use
information and telecommunication technologies (ICTs) to better disseminate market
information. Souktel provides a concrete example of how the use of technology can im-
prove labor intermediation services in the MENA region. Souktel is a private enterprise
(established in 2006) that promotes the use of mobile phone to link people with jobs,
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munities. In the Palestinian Territories, Souktel serves 10,000 job-seekers and 200 em-
ployers daily. A recent qualitative evaluation of this initiative shows that 84% of those
job seekers surveyed in the Palestinian Territories experienced a reduction in job-
search time from 12 weeks to less than 1 week, and 64% report higher monthly
incomes as a result of jobs sourced through the service. In addition, over 50% of the
surveyed job-seekers report that they are now able to support 3 or more additional
family members through new income resulting from job matches. On the other hand,
70% of surveyed Palestine employers who use Souktel's services reported a 50% or
greater reduction in hiring costs and time, and 75% of the same sample confirmed a
mean 5% increase in annual revenue, after hiring staff through Souktel (Souktel 2013.
Analysis and results produced specifically for this paper).
5.2 Develop results-based Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) frameworks
Developing results-based M&E frameworks will be critical to improve the governance,
effectiveness and efficiency of ALMPs in MENA countries, especially in light of the in-
creased demands for greater governance and social accountability post Arab Spring.
MENA countries need to establish a clear governance structure, quality assurance
mechanisms, and an M&E strategy based on results, not merely outputs, to increase
program efficiency and effectiveness and improve the use of public resources. Rigorous,
independent impact evaluations are needed to demonstrate what works, to enhance
capacity in the region, and to improve overall policy making. Also, it is crucial to con-
duct impact evaluations of new pilot programs before scaling-up nationally, in order to
make the necessary adjustments to program design and thus avoid scaling-up interven-
tions that are not effective or efficient.
Australia and Sweden are perhaps the best examples of how countries can effectively
mainstream M&E practices into the policy-making process. Their M&E systems require
that every program be evaluated every three to five years. Each ministry has to prepare
an M&E plan to evaluate their programs, identifying required resources as well as po-
tential policy implications. In addition, all completed M&E activities must be recorded
and published for transparency purposes. In all, well established M&E systems improve
service delivery, strengthen program governance and accountability, and promote a cul-
ture of evidence-based policy making (Mackay 2011; Laguna 2011; and Lahey 2011).
While resources and capacity in many developing countries are not aligned to those in
countries like Australia and Sweden, more and more employment programs, even in
the developing world, have started to include monitoring systems and to be evaluated.
In developing countries, however, these evaluations are generally donor driven. In order
to develop and improve this culture of M&E it is recommended that (i) monitoring fo-
cuses on outcomes and not on outputs, (ii) program evaluation financing is part of the
program’s budget and/or proper budget allocations are made for monitoring and evalu-
ation. While impact evaluations could be regarded as costly and methodologically chal-
lenging (often requiring the identification of control groups that are deprived from a
certain service at some point of time), the cost of impact evaluation are often small
when compared to total program allocations. It is also recommended that private and
independent firms conduct these impact evaluations, but in close consultation with
main stakeholders to assure their validity and acceptance.
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service delivery of employment programs and services. Key quantitative indicators may
include the number of visitors to local employment offices, registered job seekers, par-
ticipants in ALMPs, placements, and job vacancies filled within a certain time. Per-
formance targets might include an increase in the public employment agency’s market
share of vacancies reported by firms and a reduction in the prevalence of unemploy-
ment that is long-term (over one year) or very long-term (two years or more). A key
qualitative indicator is satisfaction on the part of job seekers and employers with the
public employment agency’s services. A results-based monitoring system enables the
oversight entities to intervene early when needed with corrective or countering action.
It is also useful to develop periodic social audits and systems/surveys to collect infor-
mation about user satisfaction and complains.
At a minimum, every public employment agency should periodically collect data on
the following core indicators (Betcherman et al. 2010):
 Job placement rate. The number of registered unemployed in quarter t who are
employed in quarter t + 1.
 Placement cost. Number of beneficiaries who obtained a job in year t divided by
program budget in year t.
 Job retention rate. The number of registered unemployed in quarter t who are
employed in both quarters t + 2 and t + 3.
 Average earnings. Average earnings in quarters t + 2 and t + 3 for those registered
unemployed in quarter t who retained employment in these quarters.
 Filled vacancy rate. The number of registered job vacancies in quarter t that are
filled by registered job seekers in quarter t + 1.
 Adequacy Rate: The share of individuals who complete training in quarter t who
are employed in quarter t + 1 in an occupation compatible with the training
provided.
 Underemployment Rate: The share of individuals who complete training in quarter t
who are employed in quarter t + 1 in a work that requires a lower education profile.
5.3. Promote entrepreneurship and self-employment
Much of the private sector in the MENA region is made up of small firms that lack in-
centives to diversify, innovate, and invest, which undermines their ability to grow and
create quality employment. Obstacles include burdensome business regulations and
discretionary enforcement, low skill levels among entrepreneurs, poor access to credit,
and subsidies that distort energy prices (Gatti et al. 2012). Given the increasing number
of university graduates and the limited absorption capacity of the public sector, it is no
surprise that many MENA countries face deteriorating labor market outcomes. For this
reason, promoting a culture of entrepreneurship that encourages experimentation and
learning among youth, especially unemployed university graduates, can improve labor
market outcomes.
Most MENA countries have developed entrepreneurship programs, and these have
had, for the most part, a limited impact on youth employment. These efforts are limited
in scale and scope, targeting primarily the low-skilled, whose businesses tend to
remain small and thus have a limited impact on job creation (See Premand et al. 2011;
Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 19 of 252013, 2:13
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/13Cho and Honorati 2012; and Haddad 2010 in Table 4). Several studies show that educa-
tional levels among the owners of micro and small informal enterprises are an import-
ant determinant of innovation, rate of return on capital, and employment growth
(World Bank 2012).
While there is little evidence showing that entrepreneurship programs have an effect
on labor market outcomes, a recent meta regression analysis (See Cho and Honorati,
World Bank 2012 in Table 4 and Additional file 1: Table A1) shows that entrepreneur-
ship programs have a positive effect on beneficiaries’ attitude towards self-employment,
an important result considering a strong preference for public sector employment
among job seekers in the region. For example, evidence from the Business Thesis Plan
Competition in Tunisia, which allows university students to develop a business plan ra-
ther than a traditional thesis to meet graduation requirements, shows that the provision
of entrepreneurship training and personalized coaching is effective in increasing the
rate of self-employment among university graduates. Of course, these types of initia-
tives need to be complemented with information, coaching, access to credit, as well as
with other instruments such as incubators and guarantee funds.
Given that labor markets in some MENA countries are rather informal and that
productivity of informal workers and firms in the region is quite low (Gatti et al. 2012),
programs seeking to increase the productivity of informal self-employed workers and
free lancers have great potential in the region. Many informal self-employed workers in
some MENA countries make below a living wage and are thus unable to support them-
selves or their families. In addition, they lack the necessary skills to compete in the new
global economy. The Samasource initiative provides an example of how employment
programs can connect informal workers in disadvantaged markets to the global digital
economy. Samasource is a non-profit organization that owns a technology platform
(the SamaHub) that breaks down digital work from large companies (such as Google or
Intel) into small tasks, or microwork, that can be completed by workers (notably youth
and women) with basic English skills and a few weeks of training at the company’s
partner centers. Samasource works with in-country NGO partners to recruit women
and youth formerly earning below a local living wage, as determined by the Fair
Wage Guide. These recruits receive 2–4 weeks of computer-based training on the
SamaHub, including English and soft skills. Workers stay in the program for an average
of 8–12 months, after which they move on to more advanced employment within their
ICT center, another employer, or return to school. To date, Samasource has connected
over 3,000 people to $2.5 million in living wages across 9 countries, notably India and
Kenya. About 75% of their beneficiaries transition out of Samasource work after one
year and 88% report to have been able to find a better job based on the experience they
gained in the program (World Bank 2012a).
The Babajobs initiative is another interesting example of how increased access to in-
formation can improve self-employment opportunities, by providing labor intermedi-
ation services to informal workers. Babajob.com is a web and mobile start-up dedicated
to bringing better job opportunities to the workers in the informal sector (cooks, maids,
security guards, office helpers, etc.) in India by connecting employers with job seekers
via the web, mobile apps, SMS, the mobile web and voice services. Since its creation in
2007, Babajob has advertised over a million job postings, benefiting over 70,000 regis-
tered employers, including many of the largest low-end employers such as Coffee Day,
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users report an average earnings increase of 20.1% and a reduction in their average
commute time by 14 minutes per day (World Bank 2012a).
5.4. Promote on-the-job and life skills training
As mentioned before, training programs are widely used by countries throughout the
MENA region, but most are provided in-class and are supply-driven. However, inter-
national evidence indicates that the effectiveness of training programs (as measured by
their insertion rates) increases when they include life-skills, on-the-job training or both
(World Bank 2012). While some of the recent available rigorous impact evaluations of
ALMPs in MENA countries (Table 4) show that their life skills component had little or
no impact on labor market outcomes, all three evaluations showed the importance of
life skills for students’ behavioral development. On the other hand, existing literature
reveals that on-the-job training programs have large positive effects on employment
outcomes, especially when they are well-targeted (Additional file 1: Table A1). Thus,
and given that lack of work experience is a major constraint to job insertion in the re-
gion (e.g.: fifty percent of the total unemployed in Morocco are first-time job seekers),
increasing on-the-job training opportunities for unemployed youth in the MENA re-
gion is critical to improve labor market outcomes in the region. A recent evaluation by
the Inter-American Development Bank of the Juventud y Empleo program in the Do-
minican Republic found that in the short run, the life skills package (on-the-job train-
ing + life skills) was more cost-effective than the traditional vocational training package
(on-the-job training + vocational training + life skills) (Martinez 2013) (Additional file 1:
Table A1).
Beyond training programs, secondary schools in MENA countries do not teach life
skills, partly because they are not measured by achievement tests. The few people who
have access to life skills training in the region are those who benefit from life skills
modules developed and implemented by civil society organizations. As a result, and as
highlighted in the World Bank MENA report on Jobs (World Bank 2012), about one-
third of employers interviewed in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen complained about the lack
of life skills of their recently hired employees.
5.5. Promote Systems and Program Integration
As discussed before, many MENA countries have developed a plethora of small and in-
dependent employment and social programs that target various groups and that are
implemented at different geographic levels and by different stakeholders. In many
cases, these programs lack complementarity and coherence, thus leading to redundancy
and inefficiencies. It is therefore critical to promote systems and program integration,
as this will help countries improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and governance of their
social protection and labor (SP&L) programs. For example, between 2009 and 2012,
Tunisia consolidated 41 employment programs into four main ALMPs (training, wage
subsidies, public works, and entrepreneurship support) and the country is currently in
the process of introducing biometric cards to better identify, target, and monitor pro-
gram beneficiaries. It is hoped that this reform paves the way for the development of a
SP&L system that includes social assistance and other relevant programs, thus helping
Tunisia improve coordination and service delivery at all levels.
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ministrative, program and policy level. At the administrative level, promoting the devel-
opment of SP&L systems requires the development of management, information and
service delivery tools. This may include: beneficiary identification systems and regis-
tries, targeting schemes, M&E, etc. At the program level, SP&L systems effectively pro-
mote the integration within and across employment and social programs, by focusing
on design and implementation issues ranging from targeting to M&E. At the policy
level, SP&L systems “ensure policy coherence attuning the entire portfolio of SP&L
programs to act coherently in delivering national goals and social contracts” (Robalino
et al. 2012).
SP&L systems require collaboration and sustained, coordinated efforts by all stake-
holders. It is a gradual process that depends on strong government support and close
partnerships with the private sector. A possible way to start this process is by designing
and piloting programs that introduce specific design and administrative features that
help integrate employment and social programs. These features include beneficiary
registries, cash delivery mechanisms, and unified targeting approaches. These pilots can
then be evaluated and, if successful, replicated at the national level, where they can
serve as the basis for SP&L systems that are cost-effective and embedded into the
country’s broader policy environment (Figure 2).
To ensure the sustainability of SP&L systems, it is critical to engage in capacity-
building activities targeted to key stakeholders, to promote ownership, and to involve
nontraditional partners (especially the private sector) in the design and implementation
of employment and social programs. Sharing of information and data access must be
expanded and strengthened. A number of countries have successfully established effect-
ive SP&L systems. For example, the United Kingdom established a one-stop shop
known as Jobcentre Plus, where beneficiaries of employment and social programs can
access a variety of services in a single place. Having a one-stop shop reduces transac-
tion and administrative costs, improves service delivery, and facilitates program moni-
toring and evaluation.
The development of SP&L systems is intrinsically linked to the promotion of the acti-
vation agenda, whereby beneficiaries from social assistance exit into ALMPs and even-
tually into jobs. The activation agenda is of utter importance for the MENA region, as
subsidies (untargeted and pro-rich) represent the most important safety net for disad-
vantaged populations in the region. As countries in the MENA region reform subsidies
and introduce targeted safety net programs, improved coordination among Ministries,
especially Labor and Social Affairs, will be critical to promote systems and program
integration.
Finally, accreditation and licensing of providers as well as the employment services
they provide (notably in the areas of training and intermediation) is also key to ensure
quality assurance and control of the services rendered. For example, in Germany, ser-
vice providers must apply for their accreditation and for the licensing of their courses
through a national accredited private body. Specifically, they have to prove that they
have the adequate financial and human capacity to: (i) provide quality and relevant
training through experienced teachers, (ii) support the integration of their trainees into
employment; and (iii) effectively monitor student progress to ensure quality assurance
and development. In addition, in order for their courses to be eligible for licensing and
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for insertion in the labor market as well as the content and time frame for the training
course, including adequate practical working experience. Accreditation and licensing of
providers and their courses is critical to improving the chances of employment of bene-
ficiaries, as it “leads to a publicly visible (quality) label” (European Union 2009).
6. Conclusion
The MENA region is facing a number of serious challenges affecting its labor markets.
They include sluggish labor demand, high rates of joblessness among youth and
women, prevalence of skills mismatches, stagnant labor mobility, high rates of informal
employment, and lack of formal employment networks. Active labor market programs
could play an important role in addressing market failures related to labor demand,
labor supply, and information asymmetries, thus increasing the employability and em-
ployment chances of program beneficiaries. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of
ALMPs depends largely on their design, as well as on the country’s institutional cap-
acity to implement them.
ALMPs have been widely used in the MENA region. While some MENA countries,
namely Tunisia and to some extent Morocco, still provide ALMPs primarily through
the public sector, others, such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, actively involve the pri-
vate sector in the provision of training, job brokerage, and other labor market services.
However, as noted in this study, public and private provision of ALMPs in MENA
countries face important institutional and operational challenges that hinder their effi-
ciency and effectiveness. These include limited administrative capacity, system and pro-
gram fragmentation, lack of adequate monitoring and evaluation systems, and flaws in
program design.
Leveraging available literature and some of the few robust impact evaluations of
ALMPs in MENA countries, this study proposes a series of reforms to improve the per-
formance of ALMPs in the MENA region. In particular, the study reveals an urgent
need to involve the private sector in the design and implementation of employment
programs in the region.. Many programs are currently designed and delivered solely by
public agencies and do not necessarily provide job seekers with the tools and skills they
need to access available vacancies. Partnering with the private sector for the delivery of
ALMPs will, therefore, be pivotal as a means to develop employment programs that
better prepare beneficiaries to respond to the needs of the private sector. These part-
nerships should include strong governance mechanisms to ensure they deliver concrete
results. Providers of employment programs should, for example, be assessed (and re-
munerated) based on their demonstrated capacity to connect beneficiaries to available
internships and jobs.
Beyond establishing stronger relationships between public and private employment
and training agencies, this study proposes a policy framework to improve the delivery
of publicly provided ALMPs in the MENA region. It identifies four main policy direc-
tives, each of which addresses the main challenges to the effective and efficient delivery
of employment services in MENA countries. These policy directives are (a) develop
results-based public-private partnerships; (b) develop results-based M&E frameworks;
(c) promote entrepreneurship/self-employment, OJT, and life skills training among job
seekers; and (d) promote systems and program integration.
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countries in the MENA region satisfy a minimum set of conditions. To begin with, pol-
itical will is needed at all levels to facilitate the involvement of private entities in the de-
livery of publicly provided ALMPs. This means enabling private actors to engage in
intermediation, as well as reforming national procurement rules and regulations to fa-
cilitate contracting and contract management. In addition, institutional capacity build-
ing is needed to ensure proper identification, selection, and monitoring of private
providers of employment services as well as to engage in effective M&E of publicly pro-
vided ALMPs. The establishment of social protection and labor systems includes setting
up administrative systems or improving existing ones, which in turn requires access to
quality data as well as improved coordination and information sharing among stake-
holders. Finally, in addition to providing technical support to potential entrepreneurs,
countries need to promote their financial literacy and access to financing. Less emphasis
on public sector hiring can also help promote entrepreneurship among job seekers.
Given these conditions, successfully implementing the proposed policy directives will
require galvanizing support and buy-in from various stakeholders, including unions.
However, for many MENA countries, there is currently a window for changing the sta-
tus quo. Efforts to improve employment outcomes among the unemployed should be
at the forefront of the policy agenda.
Endnotes
1There are many factors that explain why labor force participation of women in
MENA is low for international standards. Some claim that economic reasons explain
low female employment rates as market wages offered to unskilled women are below
their reservation wage corresponding to the value of their household chores and care-
taking (World Bank 2013). Other studies claim that social factors (such as preferences
for home-care, marital obligations, and religion) are a fundamental determinant of fe-
male employment in the region. The share of women claiming that they are inactive
due to family reasons ranges from 85 percent in urban Morocco to 96 percent in Egypt
(World Bank 2013). Results from the World Values Survey suggest that women in the
MENA region are more likely than women in other parts of the world to view the role
of fulltime domestic work as favorably as that of working for pay. Finally, available lit-
erature also claims that some laws and regulations discourage or prevent women from
having access to the labor market (World Bank 2013).
2Employability refers to a person’s ability to access a job. This concept is one element
in the European Employment Strategy first adopted by the European Union member
states in 1997.
3The main target groups for activation programs are recipients (or claimants) of in-
come replacement benefits that are conditional on availability for work. This includes
most recipients of unemployment benefits. Unfortunately, only a few countries in the
MENA region have unemployment insurance systems, namely Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Kuwait.
4In the absence of public regulation, private placement agencies will tend to concen-
trate on (or “cream off”) those unemployed persons who are most easily placed.
5Results from the World Bank (2013) indicate that while high-skilled unemployed in-
dividuals in countries like Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt (proxied by those who attained a
Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 24 of 252013, 2:13
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/13tertiary education degree) account of account for 17 of the labor force, they also ac-
count for 20 to 30 percent of the stock of unemployed.
6This EU average figure hides considerable variation: for example, Germany has a ra-
tio of about 1:200 and the Netherlands 1:60.
7High rates of registration often indicate that job seekers sign up with the national
employment agency in hopes of securing public sector employment. Indeed, in some
countries like Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia, registration with the national employment
agency is a requirement for participation in the selection process for civil servants.
8As comparison, countries such as Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, and Lithuania display
higher jobseekers-to-vacancy ratio below 5 registered unemployed per one vacancy;
while other in Eastern Europe and Central Asia display much higher jobseekers-to-va-
cancy ratio, ranging from 580 registered unemployed per one vacancy in Kosovo to 50
(24) registered unemployed per one vacancy in Armenia (Poland) (Kuddo 2009).
9Hard skills are the technical, mechanical, administrative, or other skills needed to do
a specific job. Soft skills are the cluster of personality traits and interpersonal skills that
help a person function effectively in the workplace, including social graces, language
and communication abilities, amenability to training, ability to get along with other
people, and ability to think creatively and independently.
10Prior to 2009, employment guarantees were included in some training contracts fi-
nanced by the Turkish National Employment Office, ISKUR. In-class training programs
with employment guarantees displayed much higher job placement rates (54 percent)
than similar programs without guarantees (33 percent) (see Betcherman et al. 2010).
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